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Abstract 
 
This paper exploits a unique data set on bank-firm relationships based on syndicated loan 
deals to examine the effect of banks’ credit risk and capital on firms’ risk and performance. 
Our data set is a multilevel cross-section, which essentially allows controlling for all bank 
and firm characteristics through respective fixed effects, thus avoiding concerns regarding 
omitted variables. We find that banks with higher credit risk are associated with more risky 
firms, with lower profitability and market value. In turn, we find that banks with higher risk-
weighted capital ratios lend to riskier firms with less market value. Our results are indicative 
of a strong adverse selection mechanism and highlight the need to monitor the risky banks 
more closely, especially as we consider large and influential syndicated loan deals.  
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1. Introduction 
What are the characteristics of banks that lend to firms with relatively high risk and low 
performance? The answer to this question has fundamental implications for the understanding 
of the bank-firm relationship lending, financial stability and real macroeconomic outcomes. 
Surprisingly, despite the presence of a prominent literature on relationship lending, this issue 
has been under-researched. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap in the literature by 
empirically analyzing the relation between firm risk and performance on the one hand, and 
bank capital and credit risk on the other. 
 The main proposition of our analysis is that banks with differential levels of credit 
risk and capital will be associated with firms with differential risk and performance. 
Specifically, risky and less profitable firms can have a difficult time obtaining credit from 
banks with relatively low levels of credit risk in their portfolios (risk-averse banks). In turn, 
banks with higher levels of credit risk are usually inclined to lend to more risky and less 
profitable firms (Peek and Rosengren, 2005). Thus, causality in this type of bank-firm 
relationship runs in both directions. The end result is one of a special type of cherry-pick, 
where the financially healthy banks are associated with financially healthy firms and the less 
healthy banks are associated with the less profitable firms (Jones et al., 2005). 
 The possible role of bank capital in the nexus between banks and firms is less 
straightforward. On the positive side, banks with higher capital ratios are those with more 
prudent behavior in all their activities, including lending to less risky and profitable firms 
(Diamond and Rajan, 2000; 2001; Gorton and Winton, 2000). On the negative side, a high 
capital ratio is a strong safety net for bank managers, who therefore face increased incentives 
to lend to risky borrowers that the bank would not be associated with if the level of capital 
was lower (Dahl and Shrieves, 1992; Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993; Repullo, 2004; Murfin, 
2012).       
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 We test the presence of these bank-firm relationships using data from the syndicated 
loan market. This market is ideal for our empirical tests because it usually involves large, 
systemically important banks and firms and it is a relatively competitive market. Thus, we 
expect that the results in other more traditional bank-firm relationships would be even more 
pronounced if present in the syndicated loan market. Moreover, the data from the syndicated 
loan market have a unique characteristic. They represent the only source of information at the 
loan-level, with additional information on who is the lender (the lead bank-arranger of the 
loan) and who is the borrower (firm). This allows the matching of these data with information 
on the bank and firm characteristics, which are invaluable in the empirical examination of the 
question “who lends to risky and non-performing firms.” 
 To this end, we build a unique data set on loan, bank, and firm characteristics, and 
analyze the nexus between firm risk and performance, and bank credit risk and capitalization. 
Theoretically, the direction of the causality in our analysis is not an issue. We aim to identify 
the nature of the bank-firm relationships and not which of the two parties initiates this 
relationship. However, a potential bias in our estimates may come from omitted variables 
bias, as there are many unobserved reasons behind the choice to lend to a specific firm or 
borrow from a specific bank. On this front, the structure of our sample has the additional 
merit that is a multilevel cross-sectional data set, with the different levels stemming from the 
fact that the same bank has given many loans in each time period and the same firm has 
obtained more than one loans within the same period. This allows including both bank and 
firm fixed effects, which effectively eliminate the omitted variables bias in our empirical 
models. 
 Our results show that banks with high credit-risk ratios are strongly associated with 
firms with high profit volatility, lower market value, and lower profitability. With small 
modifications, these findings hold irrespective of the variables used to proxy the credit risk of 
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banks and are economically significant. Specifically, a 1% point increase in our preferred 
measure of bank credit risk is associated with an increase in the volatility of the return on 
assets for the mean firm from 0.022 to 0.026 and a decrease in the risk-adjusted returns of the 
mean firm from 20.3 to 14.5. These results reveal a disconcerting affiliation of risky banks 
with risky firms, yielding a bad equilibrium in the market for credit. Given that this 
equilibrium is observed in the syndicated loan market, which brings together relatively large 
banks and firms, this can be a recipe for a turmoil in both the banking (and by extension in 
financial) and the products markets.        
 The role of bank capital in defining the bank-firm relationships is also quite important 
for the bank-firms relationships. We find that banks with high risk-weighted capital ratios are 
associated with firms with high volatility of returns and low market value. These findings are 
in line with the idea that overcapitalized banks will tend to take on higher risk in search for 
yield, which is in line with the adverse selection and moral hazard mechanisms of the capital-
regulation theory (Hellmann et al., 2000). We contend that our results have important 
implications for prudential regulation in light of the recent revisions under the impulse of 
Basel III.                   
 The rest of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 analyzes the theoretical links 
between firm risk and performance, and bank credit risk and capital. Section 3 discusses the 
data and the variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 discusses the empirical 
identification method and presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes with the policy 
implications of our findings.     
 
2. Theoretical considerations 
The literature on relationship lending highlights a number of beneficial effects of close bank-
firm relationships. The most notable of these effects are the alleviation of liquidity constraints 
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of firms due to the reduction in adverse selection and moral hazard problems and the longer-
term horizon of investment decisions (e.g., Rajan, 1992; Hoshi et al., 1991). However, a more 
recent strand of this literature also highlights some wrinkles in the beneficial effects of 
relationship lending. For example, Giannetti (2003) shows that banks can renew lending to 
insolvent projects and accumulate losses, which leads to increased probability of bank 
insolvency and financial instability. 
 The seminal paper on the theory of the selection of borrowers by banks is the one by 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). In this model, banks are unable to observe the exact riskiness of 
borrowers, thus they offer the same type of loan contracts to all firms. One problem with this 
modelling framework is that, in the real world, bank managers tend to cherry-pick borrowers 
based on specific screening devices such as collateral (e.g. Bester, 1985). This immediately 
suggests that banks have a clear view about the different risk levels of potential borrowers, 
especially as informational asymmetry problems decrease.  
 The opposite argument concerning the decisions of banks with different level of 
capital and credit risk to lend to healthy or less healthy firms is quite under-researched. The 
theoretical debate on this front can be traced in the work of Peek and Rosengren (2005) for 
the misallocation of credit to relatively weak firms. In a world with relatively lax regulatory 
supervision, banks follow a policy of forbearance with the troubled borrowers to avoid 
increasing their own loan-loss reserves, which will impair their capital ratios. Subsequently, 
the risky banks will be incentivized to extend their line of credit to troubled borrowers, so as 
to enable these borrowers to make interest payments on outstanding credit. 
 This line of reasoning also works in the opposite direction as well, from troubled 
firms to the worse-performing banks. The less profitable and risky firms will have a tough 
time borrowing from a healthy bank, which is likely to have superior managerial and 
monitoring capacity as a means to reduce adverse selection and moral hazard in the lending 
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process. Thus, these firms are likely to turn to less risk-averse banks, which have a history of 
lending to riskier firms. These banks will likely be characterized by higher levels of non-
performing loans and loan-loss provisions, information which is ex post disclosed to the 
public on a quarterly basis. Thus, we expect that risky (worse performing) firms are likely to 
be affiliated with risky banks and vice versa, especially when we call risky banks those with a 
relatively high amount of credit risk in their portfolios. 
 The proposition on the relationship between risky banks and risky firms is a special 
type of a more hazard problem, which however has some element of adverse selection in that 
the problem precedes the loan deal. Thus, we are referring here to a variant of the Akerlof 
(1970)-type lemon’s problem, whereby the low-quality firms will be left to choose the low-
quality banks and vice-versa, even if information is complete. This state of affairs creates a 
vicious cycle with an association of low quality firms and banks, which for markets as 
important as the syndicated loan market can be a recipe for banking instability.    
 In contrast, the role of capital in the banks’ decision to lend to relatively riskier and 
lower-profitability firms is usually studied within the theoretical bank capital regulation 
literature. This literature makes contradicting predictions about the role of bank capital. 
Diamond and Rajan (2000; 2001) and Gorton and Winton (2000) propose a number of 
mechanisms (quoted as financial fragility mechanisms) through which higher bank 
capitalization reduces lending and, thus, credit risk. The highlight of this influential literature 
is that bank capital diminishes the financial fragility that facilitates the lending process and 
will “crowd out” deposits. The resulting effect is a safer banking system through the 
reduction of the credit risk of banks. However, this literature is, in general, silent on the type 
of firms that the well-capitalized banks tend to be associated with. 
 The opposite result is established by giving bank capital the role of risk buffer, which 
expands banks’ risk-bearing capacity (e.g., Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993; Repullo, 2004). 
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In this framework, the well-capitalized banks have increased incentives to extend their credit 
to relatively risky borrowers, because holding too much capital bears an important 
opportunity cost. In fact, most empirical studies (e.g., Jokipii and Milne, 2011; Dahl and 
Shrieves, 1992) document a positive relationship between capital buffers (i.e., the distance of 
the actual level of capital from its regulatory minimum) and bank risk. Further, the recent 
paper of Murfin (2012) shows that well-capitalized banks tend to write looser contracts with 
their borrowers, while reductions in equity capital will lead to stricter contracts. This effect is 
consistent with the idea that undercapitalized banks are more cautious in their risk-taking 
strategies to shield their already low levels of capital from further deterioration.   
It becomes quite apparent, that the role of capital in the bank-firm relationships is 
ambiguous. If banks operate under the financial-fragility mechanism, then they will curtail 
lending especially to the more risky firms. If banks operate under the capacity mechanism, 
which seems to be the dominant mechanism in the existing empirical literature, they will 
possibly expand their risky activities to firms with less healthy balance sheets.   
On the basis of the above theoretical considerations and empirical facts we can 
formulate the following two testable hypotheses: 
H1: Banks with higher credit risk will be associated with more risky and worse-performing 
firms. 
H2: The better capitalized banks will most probably be associated with more risky and worse-
performing firms.              
 
3. Data 
In the empirical analysis we aim to identify the characteristics of banks, in terms of capital 
and credit risk, that lend to risky and relatively poor-performing firms. Thus, we estimate an 
empirical model of the form: 
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𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐹𝑓𝑡, 𝐿𝑙𝑡 , 𝐵𝑏𝑡, 𝑢𝑓𝑡),        (1) 
where R is a measure of risk or performance of firm f at the time of the loan origination t. In 
turn, R is a linear function of a vector of firm characteristics F that affect R, a vector of loan 
characteristics L, and a vector of the lead arranger’s (lead bank’s) characteristics B that 
include the capital and credit-risk profile of the bank. Finally, u is the stochastic disturbance, 
which for identification purposes includes both bank and firm fixed effects as we will further 
discuss below.     
Our sample consists of US syndicated loan deals that occur at a specific point in time 
(year of the loan deal), which define the bank-firm relationships. We examine the 
characteristics, mainly risk and capital, of the lead arranger in relation with the risk and 
performance of the borrowing firm. We collect our data from three different sources, with the 
cross-sectional observations of bank-firm relationships spanning the period 2000-2012.  
Our source for the syndicated loan deals is the Thomson Reuters’ Thomson One 
Banker database.1 This database provides information on the loan deal’s characteristics 
(amount, maturity, borrowing spread, performance pricing, etc.). Thomson One Banker also 
provides information for the members of the syndicate, the lead bank, and the firm that 
receives the loan. This allows matching the information from Thomson One Banker to the 
FDIC Call Reports, which is our second data source. With this matching process we obtain 
accounting bank data on a number of bank characteristics. These data are quarterly and we 
use the information on the date of the loan deal to match the time dimension with the FDIC 
Call Reports. Our final data source is Compustat, which provides accounting data for the 
firms that received the loan. These data are invaluable to measure firms’ performance and 
obtain other control variables in our estimated models.  
                                                 
1 Most empirical studies on syndicated loans use the DealScan database. However, the Thomson One Banker 
database has also been used by a large number of studies as the source for syndicated loan deals and its coverage 
is very similar with that of DealScan for our sample period.  
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The matching process of data from the three databases yields a maximum of 7,362 
observations (loan deals). However, the number of observations used for the regressions 
depends on the availability of data for the variables used in our empirical analysis. These 
observations comprise a so-called multilevel data set, which has observations on banks and 
firms (lower level) and loan deals (higher level). This is a unique feature that proves 
particularly helpful for econometric identification purposes. Table 1 formally defines all the 
variables used in the empirical analysis and Table 2 offers summary statistics. We discuss 
these variables in turn. 
 
3.1. Measures of firm risk and performance 
We use four measures of firm risk and performance that capture a variety of relevant aspects 
of firms. The first is the standard deviation of the return on assets (σROA), which is a 
standard measure of firms’ risk (e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2009). We calculate this measure 
using a rolling 12-quarter horizon of the returns on assets (ROA). The higher is the volatility 
of earnings, the higher the riskiness of the firm. The second dependent variable of our study 
is the natural logarithm of the firms’ market value of common stock. This is a market-
oriented measure of firm performance and, thus, it complements the accounting-based ratio 
by being more forward-looking.2  
 Our third measure is the accounting-data equivalent of the Sharpe ratio (e.g., Robb 
and Watson, 2012; Delis et al., 2014). We calculate this ratio using the book value of ROA 
over σ(ROA), the latter again calculated using a 12-quarter horizon. This ratio measures the 
risk-adjusted returns of each firm at each point in time. By discounting the returns on assets, 
we provide a cleaner measure of returns, which is directly comparable across industries with 
                                                 
2 An alternative measure to the log of the market value would be Tobin’s q; however, a recent literature suggests 
that Tobin’s q is an endogenous measure of performance. Specifically, Dybvig and Warachka (2013) criticize 
Tobin’s q on the basis that scale inefficiency due to underinvestment lowers firm performance but increases 
Tobin's q.  
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inherently different levels of risk. The last measure of firm performance is the simple ROA, 
which is the most standard measure of firm performance in the corporate performance 
literature (e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Hitt et al., 1997). 
 
3.2. Measures of bank credit risk and capital 
We use three variables to measure each of ex post bank credit risk and capital. For credit risk, 
we use the ratios of non-performing loans to total loans, loan-loss provisions to total loans, 
and loan charge-offs to total loans (see e.g., Grier, 2007). Consistent with our theoretical 
considerations, all these measures are ex post measures of bank credit risk, while they 
complement each other in a number of ways.  
Specifically, non-performing loans differ from loan charge-offs in that the former are 
assets that are past due 90 days or more as to principal or interest, or where reasonable doubt 
exists as to timely collection. In contrast, loan charge-offs occur when a loan is de facto an 
irrecoverable bad loan. The pairwise correlation coefficient between the two ratios in our 
sample is equal to 0.77. In turn, provisions for loan losses are somewhat more forward 
looking, as it represent the expense set aside by the bank for loan defaults (charge-offs). 
Thus, loan-loss provisions are very highly correlated with loan charge-offs, as the bank 
assigns a value for provisions approximately equal to the loans written off. Indeed, we find 
that the pairwise correlation coefficient in our sample is equal to 0.95.  
 With respect to bank capital, we use the ratio of risk-based capital to risk-weighted 
assets and we complement it with the basic ratio of total bank capital to total assets and the 
ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets. The first ratio is the one primarily used by bank 
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regulators, as it includes all types of capital and the element of risk weights. Accordingly, it is 
the one favored in our empirical analysis (for details, see Grier, 2007).3    
 
3.3. Control variables 
In unreported regressions we experiment with more than 200 firm-level control variables that 
may affect firm risk and returns (available from Compustat), loan-level variables aggregated 
at the firm-level (available from Thomson One Banker), and bank-level variables (available 
from the FDIC Call Reports). We resort to the use of variables that are theoretically 
motivated, are not multicollinear and show at least some statistical significance in some of 
the estimated models. Further, we also use a crisis dummy variable for the years 2007-2008 
to capture the potential adverse effects of the subprime crisis on firm risk and performance. 
 At the firm level, we control for firm size, efficiency, liquidity, and age. In the 
literature, the effect of firm size on firms’ risk and performance is ambiguous (Richard et al., 
2004; Delis et al., 2014), with positive forces on performance stemming from economies of 
scale, while negative forces stemming from lack of specialization, value-destroying M&A 
deals, etc. Firm efficiency (measured here by the ratio of firm sales to total assets), should be 
positively related with returns. However, the effect of this variable on risk is also likely to be 
positive, because firms with high sales to assets ratios are likely to have higher profit 
volatility. As a proxy for liquidity we use the so-called current ratio (ratio of current assets to 
current liabilities). We expect that the higher the current ratio, the lower firms’ risk and the 
higher the performance. Also, firm age is related to shareholder and managerial experience 
and we expect that, if anything, this measure is positively related to firm performance. In 
                                                 
3 Note that using this variable is, in our analysis, essentially the same with using the respective capital-buffers 
variable, because there have been no alternations in the minimum capital requirement during our sample period. 
Thus, subtracting the 8% minimum from the risk-weighted capital ratio for all available observations will not 
yield any changes in the empirical results or in inference. 
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addition to these variables we control for firm fixed effects in all our estimated equations to 
capture any remainder unobserved characteristics of firms.   
 Concerning the loan-level variables, we use the average all-in-one spread of all the 
loans that are obtained by each firm in our sample within a specific year. We expect that 
higher spreads are linked to more risky and worse-performing firms because of the pricing of 
the higher risk premium. Further, we use a dummy variable to capture the extent to which the 
firm uses covenants to safeguard loan deals. We expect that these firms are in general less 
risky. 
 The last group of control variables is related to the characteristics of the lead bank of 
the loan syndicate.4 We experiment with many variables related to bank size, efficiency, 
liquidity, types of bank risk other than credit risk, but we find that most of these variables are 
statistically insignificant determinants of firm risk or performance. We find that bank size 
plays a significant role, in line with our theoretical discussion above, and thus we include the 
logarithm of total assets along with the bank capital and credit risk variables in the regression 
equations. We also use variables characterizing bank risk in general, as opposed to credit risk 
in particular. The most obvious measure of bank risk is the Z-score (a formal definition is 
provided in Table 1), which serves as a proxy for the risk of bank default or total bank risk 
(see e.g., Fu et al., 2014). Higher values on the Z-score reflect lower risk of default. Also, 
similar to the case of firm-level variables, we control for bank fixed effects in all the 
estimated equations.               
 
4. Empirical methodology and findings 
4.1. Econometric identification 
                                                 
4 We do not find any effect stemming from the characteristics of the rest of the banks in the syndicate.  
13 
 
Theoretically, our study is not intended to identify a causal relation of bank capital and credit 
risk on firm risk and performance. Instead we are interested in identifying the lending 
channels from risky banks to risky and non-performing firms. This implies that the direction 
of causality (i.e. whether it runs from banks to firms or vice versa) is not important in our 
study. On this front, we simply aim to identify associations and thus we can begin our 
analysis with simple OLS models that include firm fixed effects. However, the presence of 
omitted variables is very much possible and this can create a bias in our estimates of bank 
capital and risk.   
The fact that our data set is a multilevel cross section, with specific firms making 
multiple loan deals with a specific lead bank, allows using bank and firm fixed effects to 
control for virtually all the omitted variables.5 This is a unique feature of our data set that 
makes econometric identification robust, as it thoroughly accounts for any omitted variables 
bias. Subsequently, estimation with OLS on this high-dimensional fixed effects model yields 
best linear unbiased estimates and allows avoiding instrumental variables estimators that 
could lead to bias due to imperfect instrumentation. The particular methodology used is 
thoroughly described in Gormley and Matsa (2014). Jimenez et al. (2012; 2014) use a similar 
identification method with multilevel data to avoid the same identification problems. 
 
4.2. Empirical results  
The first four columns of Table 3 report the empirical results from the OLS regressions 
including firm fixed effects. Non-performing loans are negative and statistically significant 
determinants of market value and the Sharpe ratio. Economically, a 1% point increase in non-
                                                 
5 The time dimension is not an issue, because the loan deals are unique (not repeated in time). Thus, the bank 
and firm fixed effects already incorporate the information concerning any structural, regulatory and 
macroeconomic developments common to all banks. Indeed, if we include year fixed effects in our models we 
find that these fixed effects are jointly statistically insignificant. To avoid over-identification of our models, we 
exclude the year fixed effects. Below we do carry out additional analysis to inquire about the effect of the time 
dimension in our findings.    
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performing loans leads to a 0.088 point reduction in the market value of firms and a 1.84 
point reduction in the Sharpe ratio. These are equivalent to approximately a 1.3% reduction in 
the market value and a 9.07% reduction in the Sharpe ratio. 
The next four columns report the empirical results from the regressions including 
bank non-performing loans as the measure of credit risk. In the first and the last two 
regressions, non-performing loans are now statistically significant at the 1% level, with a 1% 
point increase in non-performing loans increasing σ(ROA) by 0.004 points. In other words, 
for the firm with a mean σ(ROA) this implies an economically significant increase from 
0.022 to 0.026. The equivalent decreases in the Sharpe ratio and the ROA are also 
economically significant. Specifically, a 1% point increase in non-performing loans yields a 
5.8 point reduction in the Sharpe ratio (mean equals 20.3), and a 0.016 reduction in ROA 
(mean equals 0.12), all of which are sizeable effects.   
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 The bank risk-weighted capital significantly determines σ(ROA) and market value. In 
particular, the banks with a high risk-weighted capital ratio seem to be associated with firms 
with high variability of profits and low market value.6 A 1% point increase in the risk-
weighted capital increases σ(ROA) by approximately 0.26% points. For a firm with an 
average σ(ROA) this increase is equivalent to an increase from 0.022 to 0.0276. These results 
are in line with the theoretical literature on the moral hazard behavior of banks that hold 
higher levels of capital. In other words, the role of bank capital as a risk buffer expands the 
risk-bearing capacity of banks and increases incentives to lend to riskier firms (e.g., Repullo, 
2004). 
In Tables 4 and 5 we replicate the results of the last four columns of Table 3, this time 
using loan-loss provisions and loan charge-offs as our measure of credit risk, respectively. 
                                                 
6 We document similar results when we use the total bank capital or the Tier 1 capital ratio, except from the fact 
that the latter ratio has a statistically significant effect on the Sharpe ratio instead of the market value. These 
results are available upon request. 
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The regressions of both tables show a qualitatively very similar picture with that of Table 3, 
even though the number of available observations differs substantially. Specifically, loan-loss 
provisions increase the σ(ROA) of firms and reduce their market value and ROA. Also, the 
effect of a 1% point increase in loan-loss-provisions is economically smaller compared to the 
respective effect of non-performing loans. In turn, the loan charge-offs also increase the 
σ(ROA) and decrease the Sharpe ratio. The economic significance of the loan charge-offs is 
the largest among the three bank credit-risk variables in the Sharpe-ratio equations, which is 
intuitive given the de facto increase in the credit risk reflected by this variable. 
[Insert Tables 4&5 about here] 
 In Table 6 we report the results from the equations that include the bank Z-score 
instead of the bank risk-weighted capital.7 We do not include both these variables in the same 
equation because the Z-score includes information on bank capital. We only report the results 
based on the non-performing loans ratio as the measure of credit risk, which is also included 
given that credit and total bank risk are two relatively different notions. Even though these 
regressions have a somewhat lower number of observations, the non-performing loans ratio is 
the one favored by the majority of the banking literature (e.g., Fernández and González, 
2005; Bushman and Williams, 2012). 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 We find that the bank Z-score is positively related with firms’ market value, the 
Sharpe ratio and the ROA and this effect is strongly statistically and economically significant. 
Moreover, the effect of the Z-score is independent of the respective effect of non-performing 
loans, implying that several types of bank risk other than credit risk have a direct bearing on 
the bank-firm relationships. Evidently, banks with a lower probability of defaults (higher Z-
score) are likely to be associated with better-performing firms.    
                                                 
7 We also use the probability of default (Fu et al., 2014) and the results are very similar. 
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 We examine the sensitivity of our results using a number of additional robustness 
tests (results are available on request) on the potential in-sample heterogeneity of our 
estimates due to other bank characteristics and macroeconomic developments. First, we 
examine whether the results change in the periods before and after 2007 (the year of the 
subprime crisis origination), by including the interaction term of our bank credit-risk and 
capital variables with a dummy that takes the value one in the period 2000-2006 and zero 
otherwise. However, these interaction terms are statistically insignificant. 
 Second, we examine whether there is interplay between bank credit risk and bank 
capital in determining firms’ risk and performance. Given the finding that both bank credit 
risk and risk-based capital have a positive effect on the variability of returns, this is a test of 
the hypothesis that for banks with high capital ratios, the positive relation between bank 
credit risk and firms risk will be more significant for those banks with higher capital. 
However, this interaction term is also statistically insignificant.  
Finally, we experiment with interaction terms of bank credit-risk with bank size and 
market power, as well as of bank capital with bank size and market power. For market power 
we introduce a Lerner index of market power, estimated as in Delis et al. (2014). However, 
even these interaction terms are found to be statistically insignificant.      
 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
This article examines the profile of banks that lend to firms with higher risk and lower 
profitability. We use a unique data set of syndicated loans, which has two important 
advantages. First, it allows building a sample on bank-firm relationships where all the 
important observable characteristics of firms and banks are available through a merging 
process with other databases. Second, it represents a multilevel cross-sectional data set, with 
the important feature of repeated observations across firms and banks. This allows controlling 
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for essentially all the bank and firm characteristics through the use of bank and firm fixed 
effects. 
 We examine the profile of banks in terms of their levels of credit risk and capital, 
which are the variables characterizing the theoretical nexus in the decision to lend in the 
majority of the theoretical literature. We find that banks with high credit risk de facto lend to 
firms with higher profit volatility, lower market value and lower profitability ratios (simple or 
risk-adjusted). These effects are so economically significant and document an important 
adverse selection mechanism in financial intermediation, whereby the risky banks are 
affiliated with risky and worse-performing firms. We also find that banks with relatively high 
levels of risk-weighted capital are associated with firms with higher volatility of returns and 
lower market value.   
Taken together with the fact that we examine the syndicated loan market, which 
involves relative large banks and firms and is deemed to be quite competitive and transparent, 
our results have important policy implications. With respect to bank credit risk, our results 
show that there is a special type of a moral hazard mechanism potentially working in both 
directions, from firms to banks and vice versa. If this mechanism is considered as a bad 
equilibrium in a multiple equilibrium framework (the good one being the relationship lending 
between healthy banks and firms), then this is a recipe for market failure.  
With respect to bank capital, our findings are in line with an important theoretical 
literature on the way higher levels of capital inflict adverse selection and moral hazard in the 
lending behavior of banks. Subsequently, this creates room for prudential supervision, 
whereby the bank regulators should monitor the projects undertaken by overly risky and well-
capitalized banks more closely. This proposal is quite timely in light of the discussion 
surrounding the newly introduced leverage ratio (in terms of Tier 1 capital) under Basel III. 
 Evidently, the emphasis on the types of bank-firm relationships, especially in large 
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loan deals, based on credit risk is quite important in light of the higher capital requirements 
imposed on banks. Our results suggest that targeting credit risk more directly could enhance 
the soundness of the bank lending activity and could break this multiplicity of equilibria, 
yielding a more stable syndicated loan market. The emphasis on bank capital alone, despite 
promoting a safer banking environment, has the limitation that it also exacerbates the adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems in the market for loans.    
Certainly, further analysis is needed to identify which loans (and borrowers) are very 
risky and which ones are required as a means to improve the growth potential of the relatively 
worse-performing firms. To this end, potential extensions of research include separating the 
firms into risky and less risky ones or analyzing the effect of bank capital and risk on the 
probability of firm growth or default. Identifying causal mechanisms around these 
relationships are clear challenges for future research.     
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Table 1 
Variable definitions and sources 
Variable Definition Source 
 
Dependent variables 
  
σ(ROA) The variance of firm ROA, where ROA is the ratio of profits before taxes to 
total assets and σ(ROA) is calculated over a rolling window of 12 quarters. 
Compustat  
Market value Natural logarithm of the market value of common stock of firms. Compustat  
Sharpe ROA/ σ(ROA), where ROA is the ratio of profits before taxes to total assets 
and σ(ROA) is calculated over a rolling window of 12 quarters. 
Compustat  
ROA Ratio of profits before taxes to total assets. Compustat  
 
Firm-level explanatory variables 
Firm size Natural logarithm of the dollar value of firms’ sales. Compustat  
Firm efficiency Ratio of firm sales to total assets. Compustat  
Firm liquidity Ratio of current assets to current liabilities. Compustat  
Firm age Firm age in years. Compustat  
Borrowing spread All-in-one spread of the average firms’ loan deals. Thomson Reuters 
General covenants Dummy variable equal to one if the firm uses general covenants in its loan 
deals and zero otherwise. 
Thomson Reuters 
   
Bank-level explanatory variables 
Bank capital Ratio of total bank capital to total assets. FDIC Call Reports 
Bank risk-weighted capital Ratio of risk-based bank capital to risk-weighted assets. FDIC Call Reports 
Bank Tier 1 capital Ratio of Tier 1 bank capital to risk-weighted assets. FDIC Call Reports 
Bank non-performing loans Ratio of bank non-performing loans to total loans. FDIC Call Reports 
Bank loan-loss provisions Ratio of bank loan-loss provisions to total loans. FDIC Call Reports 
Bank loan charge-offs Ratio of bank net loan charge-offs to total loans. FDIC Call Reports 
Bank size Natural logarithm of total bank assets. FDIC Call Reports 
Bank Z-score (Bank ROA + Bank capital)/Bank σ(RΟΑ), where Bank ROA is the ratio of 
profits before taxes to total assets and Bank capital is as above. 
FDIC Call Reports 
   
Other variables   
Crisis dummy Dummy variable equal to one for the years 2007 and 2008 and zero otherwise. Own calculations 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics 
Variable  Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
σ(ROA) 3,806 0.022 0.110 0.001 6.224 
Market value 3,408 6.897 2.132 -0.864 12.468 
Sharpe 3,526 20.284 26.209 -21.993 339.703 
ROA 3,704 0.121 0.111 -2.004 0.766 
Firm size 3,824 6.890 1.915 0.003 12.410 
Firm efficiency 3,827 0.961 0.800 0.001 7.567 
Firm liquidity 3,185 1.800 1.608 0.059 36.508 
Firm age 3,982 20.933 16.799 1 59 
Borrowing spread 7,362 210.41 136.27 7.00 1,200.0 
General covenants 7,362 1.286 1.604 0 1 
Bank capital 7,359 0.089 0.039 0.047 0.493 
Bank risk-weighted capital 5,259 0.114 0.035 0.001 0.376 
Bank Tier 1 capital 5,259 0.081 0.027 0.001 0.368 
Bank non-performing loans 6,019 0.016 0.017 0.000 0.091 
Bank loan-loss provisions 7,359 0.009 0.010 0.000 0.063 
Bank loan charge-offs 7,359 0.008 0.008 0.000 0.072 
Bank size 7,362 18.635 1.595 11.817 20.980 
Bank Z-score 3,032 1.578 1.795 -40.893 7.702 
Notes: The table reports the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum, 
and maximum of the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
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Table 3 
The effect of risk-weighted bank capital and non-performing loans on firms’ performance 
Dependent variable:  σ(ROA) Market value Sharpe Profitability σ(ROA) Market value Sharpe Profitability 
Firm size -0.007* 0.882*** 1.991*** 0.006 -0.006*** 0.495*** 1.071 -0.024* 
 (-1.68) (29.48) (3.90) (1.28) (-2.57) (4.57) (0.65) (-1.93) 
Firm efficiency 0.002 -0.751*** 1.734* 0.027*** 0.016*** -0.560** 0.383 0.109*** 
 (0.84) (-12.09) (1.71) (4.98) (2.93) (-1.88) (0.1) (4.89) 
Firm liquidity -0.000 0.075*** -0.590** 0.001 -0.002** 0.026** 0.048 -0.002 
 (-0.35) (3.06) (-2.00) (0.33) (-1.89) (2.48) (0.2) (-0.84) 
Firm age 0.000 -0.009*** 0.068 -0.000** 0.001** 0.115*** -0.390 0.001 
 (0.34) (-4.35) (1.25) (-2.33) (2.44) (3.89) (-1.42) (0.84) 
Borrowing spread 0.000*** -0.004*** -0.030*** -0.000*** 0.000 -0.001*** -0.010 -0.000 
 (2.67) (-9.64) (-5.78) (-4.55) (0.53) (-2.62) (-1.39) (-0.28) 
General covenants -0.003** -0.057** 0.544 0.008** -0.000 0.016 0.156 0.002 
 (-2.53) (-2.32) (1.24) (2.47) (-0.88) (0.58) (0.39) (0.92) 
Bank risk-weighted capital 0.075 -1.038 3.762 -0.535*** 0.256** -13.061*** -77.311 0.126 
 (0.63) (-0.74) (0.12) (-2.93) (2.34) (-3.1) (-0.79) (0.3) 
Bank non-performing loans 0.140 -8.805** -183.531** 0.010 0.401*** 2.387 -576.188*** -1.579*** 
 (0.88) (-2.45) (-2.13) (0.03) (2.88) (0.2) (-3.05) (-2.58) 
Bank size 0.001 0.021 0.340 0.004** -0.001 0.031 2.232 0.008 
 (0.26) (0.90) (0.65) (2.04) (-0.72) (0.39) (1.51) (1.43) 
Crisis dummy -0.000 0.313*** 2.186 0.015** 0.003 -0.517* 5.038 0.003 
 (-0.02) (3.91) (1.23) (1.99) (0.82) (-1.64) (0.86) (0.21) 
Observations 1,913 1,644 1,876 1,916 1,913 1,644 1,876 1,916 
Notes: The first four columns report coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) from the OLS regressions with firm fixed effects. The rest of the table 
reports respective results from the multiple high-dimensional fixed effects model, where firm and bank fixed effects are included in the regression equations. The 
t-statistics are calculated from cluster-robust standard errors. The dependent variables of each regression are reported in the first line of the table. All variables are 
defined in Table 1. The F-test that bank and firm fixed effects are equal to zero has a p-value = 0 in all regressions. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 level, respectively. 
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Table 4 
The effect of risk-weighted bank and loan-loss provisions on firms’ 
performance 
Dependent variable:  σ(ROA) Market value Sharpe ROA 
Firm size -0.006*** 0.505*** 0.848 -0.026** 
 (-2.78) (5.15) (0.45) (-2.09) 
Firm efficiency 0.016*** -0.550** 0.092 0.109*** 
 (2.63) (-1.88) (0.03) (5.07) 
Firm liquidity -0.002* 0.026*** 0.127 -0.001 
 (-1.85) (2.75) (0.58) (-0.45) 
Firm age 0.001** 0.075** -0.279 -0.000 
 (2.12) (1.97) (-1.00) (0.32) 
Borrowing spread 0.000 -0.001*** -0.012* -0.000 
 (0.93) (-3.15) (-1.64) (-0.29) 
General covenants -0.001 0.010 0.233 0.024 
 (-1.02) (0.33) (0.59) (1.16) 
Bank risk-weighted capital 0.256** -10.567** -85.755 0.197 
 (2.47) (-2.58) (-1.00) (0.47) 
Bank loan-loss provisions 0.329** -11.566* -198.587 -1.041** 
 (2.32) (-1.79) (-1.63) (-2.06) 
Bank size -0.000 0.046 1.277 0.004 
 (-0.25) (0.57) (1.09) (0.72) 
Crisis dummy -0.001 -0.099 6.022** 0.018* 
 (-0.35) (-1.23) (2.39) (1.76) 
Observations 1,949 1,672 1,912 1,952 
Notes: The table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) from the 
multiple high-dimensional fixed effects model, where firm and bank fixed effects are 
included in the regression equations. The t-statistics are calculated from cluster-robust 
standard errors. The dependent variables of each regression are reported in the first line of 
the table. All variables are defined in Table 1. The F-test that bank and firm fixed effects 
are equal to zero has a p-value = 0 in all regressions. The ***, **, and * marks denote 
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 level, respectively. 
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Table 5 
The effect of risk-weighted bank capital and loan charge-offs on firms’ 
performance 
Dependent variable:  σ(ROA) Market value Sharpe ROA 
Firm size -0.006** 0.509*** 0.519 -0.026** 
 (-2.57) (5.04) (0.28) (-2.02) 
Firm efficiency 0.016*** -0.561* 0.242 0.109*** 
 (2.92) (1.90) (0.07) (4.98) 
Firm liquidity -0.002* 0.027*** 0.099 -0.001 
 (-1.83) (2.93) (0.44) (-0.43) 
Firm age 0.001** 0.076* -0.543 0.001 
 (2.20) (1.80) (-1.59) (0.60) 
Borrowing spread 0.000 -0.001*** -0.010 0.000 
 (1.06) (-3.30) (-1.50) (-0.82) 
General covenants -0.001 0.010 0.395 0.002 
 (-1.08) (0.32) (1.00) (0.97) 
Bank risk-weighted capital 0.254** -11.045** -35.798 0.102 
 (2.28) (-2.58) (-0.41) (0.24) 
Bank loan charge-offs 0.512** -13.301 -712.479*** -0.672 
 (2.75) (-1.23) (-2.76) (-0.85) 
Bank size 0.000 0.037 1.016 0.004 
 (0.02) (0.47) (0.86) (0.58) 
Crisis dummy 0.000 -0.115 5.184** 0.003* 
 (-0.08) (-1.41) (2.23) (1.73) 
Observations 1,949 1672 1,912 1,952 
Notes: The table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) from the 
multiple high-dimensional fixed effects model, where firm and bank fixed effects are 
included in the regression equations. The t-statistics are calculated from cluster-robust 
standard errors. The dependent variables of each regression are reported in the first line of 
the table. All variables are defined in Table 1. The F-test that bank and firm fixed effects are 
equal to zero has a p-value = 0 in all regressions. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 level, respectively. 
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Table 6 
The effect of non-performing loans and total bank risk on firms’ 
performance 
Dependent variable:  σ(ROA) Market value Sharpe ROA 
Firm size -0.008*** 0.559*** -2.569 -0.012 
 (-2.77) (5.01) (-0.62) (-1.42) 
Firm efficiency 0.023*** -1.461*** -11.840 -0.005 
 (3.42) (-5.89) (-1.55) (-0.29) 
Firm liquidity -0.002 -0.029 -1.042** -0.008*** 
 (-1.41) (1.15) (-2.33) (-4.90) 
Firm age 0.001** 0.034* -0.374* -0.001 
 (2.09) (1.64) (-1.72) (-0.84) 
Borrowing spread 0.000 -0.001*** -0.008 0.000 
 (1.16) (-3.00) (-0.97) (0.23) 
General covenants -0.001* 0.008 0.514 0.001 
 (-1.87) (0.37) (1.22) (0.56) 
Bank non-performing loans 0.434*** -14.361*** -477.616*** -1.157*** 
 (2.71) (-2.67) (-3.26) (-3.25) 
Bank Z-score -0.005 0.757*** 8.236*** 0.098*** 
 (-1.37) (6.35) (3.88) (11.27) 
Bank size 0.001 0.029 0.691 0.002 
 (0.74) (0.87) (0.65) (0.59) 
Crisis Dummy -0.000 -0.045 5.709* 0.009 
 (-0.13) (-0.57) (1.91) (1.62) 
Observations 2,346 2,078 2,313 2,352 
Notes: The table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) from the 
multiple high-dimensional fixed effects model, where firm and bank fixed effects are 
included in the regression equations. The t-statistics are calculated from cluster-robust 
standard errors. The dependent variables of each regression are reported in the first line of 
the table. All variables are defined in Table 1. The F-test that bank and firm fixed effects are 
equal to zero has a p-value = 0 in all regressions. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 level, respectively. 
 
